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STUDENT NOTES
NAVIGABILITY OF WATERS IN KENTUCKY
A recent Kentucky case, Natcher v. City of Bowling Green," raises
the question of when, in the law of Kentucky, a river or stream will
be considered navigable. In this case the defendant city had erected a
dam across Barren River at a point below a pool from which the city
drew its water supply, and also below plaintiff's gravel bars, which pre-
viously, though submerged during part of the year, were at other times
exposed and available for commercial exploitation. The effect of the
dam was to submerge these bars even during periods of low water and
render it impossible to remove any gravel. Plaintiff brought action
to compel the removal of the dam and to recover damages for the
destruction of her gravel bars. From a judgment for the defendant in
the circuit court, the plaintiff appealed.
The city contended that one of the primary purposes of the dam
was improvement of the stream for purposes of navigation, though
it was established that steamboats had never been able to come
farther upstream than about twelve miles below the city, and the only
effect of the dam was to create facilities for small boats for about
two miles upstream. The court rejected this contention, saying "The
conclusion is inescapable that this dam was erected to improve the
facilities of the waterworks system and that the improvement of navi-
gation, even for the small canoes and skiffs, was purely incidental and
a very minor consideration. Even the accomplishment of such col-
lateral purpose would not and did not 'improve navigation' in the
eyes of the law. In the legal test of navigability of a stream, it is
generally held that the fact of its sufficiency for pleasure boating or
for hunters or fishermen to float their skiffs or canoes does not make
it navigable in law as 'to be navigable a water course must have a
useful capacity as a public highway of transportation.' . . . The use of
a stream by a boat a few times in many years for a picnic or excur-
sion cannot be deemed a navigation.... The true criterion of naviga-
bility of a river is whether it is generally and commonly useful for
some purpose of trade or commerce of a substantial and permanent
character-. ... The court therefore reversed the judgment of the
trial court, holding that since the city did not take plaintiff's property
in the exercise of its delegated plenary power to improve navigation,
it was liable in damages for the destruction of her gravel bars.
W7hat is the test of navigability? Under the rule established by
the English common law, navigability was attributed only to those
waters and streams in which the tide ebbed and flowed.2 The reason
1264 Ky. 584, 95 S. W. (2d) 255 (1936).
2 Case del Royall Piscarie de le Banne, Davis, 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540
(1611); Murphy v. Ryan, 2 Ir. R. C. L. 143 (1868); Pearee v. Scotcher,
9 Q. B. D. 162 (1882).
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for the rule lay in the geographical fact that nearly all British rivers
which are navigable in fact are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide. The rule was adopted into the early American law for the same
reason; in the Atlantic coast states, only those waters below fall line
are navigable in fact, and all waters below fall line are to some degree
tidal. Since "navigable" and "tidal" were as a matter of fact so nearly
synonymous, there is little reason to wonder at the adoption of the
tidal test of navigability, particularly as such a test is definite and
easily ascertainable.
This is not to say that by the common law rule there was no
public right of navigation of those few streams which were navigable
as a matter of fact and yet non-tidal. However, tidal waters were
considered navigable from their very nature, constituting a right of
way for the public for every purpose of navigation, whereas the public
right of navigation in non-tidal rivers was not a general common law
right, but depended upon a grant from the owners of the underlying
soil, a legislative act, or a usage creating a prescriptive right.
3
Later American decisions, representing the rule in many states
and in the federal courts, abandoned the common law doctrine as un-
suited to American conditions, and substituted therefor the rule that
if a stream or other water were navigable in fact, it would be con-
sidered navigable in law.
4
Which rule does Kentucky follow? The cases in which the ques-
tion of navigability of waters is decided appear to fall into two classes.
One such series deals with the question of title to banks and stream
bed below high water mark, the other with the public right to navi-
gate. At common law, it was well established that title to the river
bed up to high water mark was in the public if the river were navi-
gable, whereas the title of riparian owners extended to the "thread"
or middle line of non-navigable streams.; Determination of the title
to the stream bed necessarily, therefore, involved determination of the
navigability of the stream.
The earliest Kentucky case containing a reference to this ques-
tion is that of Thrman v. Morrison!
6 Though the question actually
determined therein was the liability of the defendant therein for de-
struction by his flatboat of the plaintiff's logway, there is dictum to
the effect that the Ohio River being a "public navigable stream", the
court would be "inclined", if the question were involved, to regard
the bed of the river below low water mark as belonging to the public,
thus recognizing in effect the test of actual navigability, since the
Ohio is, as a matter of common knowledge, a non-tidal stream.
However, when the question did actually arise in the case of
Ewing v. Colquhoun, 2 App. Cas. 839 (1877).
The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 443, 13 L. Ed. 1053
(1851).
5 Berry v. Snyder, 3 Bush 266, 96 Am. Dec. 219 (Ky. 1367).
614 B. Mlon. 296 (Ky. 1853).
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Berry v. Snyder the court, recognizing that though the Ohio is navi-
gable in fact it is a non-tidal stream, held that such a river must be
considered non-navigable in law and that the title to a sand-bar lying
in the stream below high water mark was in the riparian owner. This
rule was again adhered to in the case of Miller v. Hepburn,8 which in-
volved determination of the title to accretions to lands bordering on
the Ohio. In Williamsburg Boom Co. v. Smith the court did not dis-
cuss the question of navigability, but stated the law as being that
"grants of land upon navigable waters above tide-water vest the soil
ad filum aquae in the grantee," thus apparently assuming that the
test of navigability was one of fact but that navigability was imma-
terial in the determination of riparian titles.
In Wilson v. Watson,0 however, the court again recognized the
common law rule that "only those waterways are deemed navigable In
which the tide ebbs and flows" and that "all grants of land bounded
upon a river, at a point above the ebb and flow of the tide, whether
navigable in fact or not, entitled the grantee to all islands lying be-
tween the mainland and the thread of the current." The Kentucky
court has also held that all streams in Kentucky, where riparian
rights are involved, must be regarded as non-navigable." And some
cases entirely ignore the question of navigability, stating merely that
it is well settled that a conveyance of land to a water course and
thence with the stream passes title to the thread or center of the
stream.? In Baxter v. Davis,t the latest of this class of cases, the
court held that Rockcastle River, being a non-tidal stream, was to be
considered non-navigable, and that therefore the true boundary line
of the tract in controversy was the middle of the stream.
The second class of cases in which the Kentucky court has de-
termined the legal navigability of waters consists of those cases in
which the public right to use such streams for purposes of navigation
is involved. Here the court seems to apply the test of navigability in
faot. It appears that "where water is navigable, whether or not with-
in the ebb and flow of the tide, the public have a common right to
use it for navigation as a public highway", even in the absence of a
legislative declaration that it is a public highway." If a stream, in
its natural condition, is capable of being used for floating vessels,
1Supra, note 5.
118 Bush, 326 (Ky. 1871).
9 84 Ky. 372, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 369, 1 S. W. 765 (1886).
10 141 Ky. 324, 132 S. W. 563, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227 (1910).
"Strange v. Spalding, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 305, 29 S. W. 137 (1895);
Robinson v. Wells, 142 Ky. 800, 135 S. W. 317 (1911).
3Ky. Lumber Co. v. Green, 87 Ky. 257, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 139, S S. W.
439 (1888); Cruikshanks v. Wilmer & Wilson, 93 Ky. 19, 18 S. W.
1018 (1892); Runion v. Alley, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 268, 39 S. W. 849
(1897).
"252 Ky. 525, 67 S. W. (2d) 678 (1934).
"Monongahela River Cons. Coal & Coke Co. v. Lancaster's Admr.,
169 Ky. 24, 183 S. W. 258 (1916).
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rafts, logs, etc., and has in fact been used for that purpose, the public
has an easement of navigation in it." A creek susceptible, at certain
periods of the year, of valuable use for the purpose of floating logs to
market must be considered, to that extent, a navigable or floatable
stream.'" It is not essential that the navigable capacity of the stream
should be continuous; it is sufficient if its periods of high water and
navigable capacity continue a sufficient length of time to make it use-
ful as a highway."7 But a stream that is not capable, during freshets,
unaided by artificial means, of floating saw logs, is not a public high-
way for that purpose." And a stream may be navigable for the pur-
pose of floating logs and timber to market, though it is not navigable
for boats at ordinary stages of the river. 9 The Kentucky courts will
take judicial notice of the navigable character of the Ohio River,- and
of the Kentucky River,- but it cannot be assumed that such a stream
as Straight Creek, in Bell County, is navigable, although courts might
take judicial notice of the fact in regard to streams of more public
importance."
It appears, therefore, that the legal test of navigability of waters
in Kentucky depends entirely upon the question involved. If it is a
question of the title of riparian owners to the bed of the stream, the
common law or tidal test of navigability is applied; if the question is
one of the right of the public to navigate the stream, or the right of a
governmental agency to improve it, as in the principal case, the test
is whether the stream is navigable in fact. There appears to be no
particular reason for the distinction, but on the other hand there seems
to be no particular inconvenience resulting from it.
JosEPH S. FREELAND.
TORTS: LIMITATION OF DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUI-
SANCE IN KENTUCKY TO PERSONS UNDER
14 YEARS OF AGE
In the case of Dennis' Administrator v. Kentucky and West Vir-
ginia Power Company' a boy, 16 years of age, who had climbed defend-
ant's electric transmission tower in order to see a ball game on a
"Goodin's Exrs. v. Ky. Lumber Co., 90 Ky. 625, 12 Ky. Law Rep.
573, 14 S. W. 775 (1890); Floyd County v. Allen, 190 Ky. 532, 227 S. W.
994 (1921).
"I Ford Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. McQueen, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 521
(Super. Ct. 1892).
"l Murray v. Preston, 106 Ky. 561, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 72, 50 S. W.
1095 (1399).
" Banks v. Frazier, 111 Ky. 909, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1197, 64 S. W.
983 (1901).
"Ireland v. Bowman, 130 Ky. 153, 113 S. W. 56, 17 Ann. Cas. 786
(1908).
"'Bennett v. Bryan, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 274 (1880).
"Warner v. Ford Lumber and Mfg Co., 123 Ky. 103, 93 S. W. 650
(1906).
2 Hoskins v. Archer, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 671 (1885).
K. L. J.--6
